Abstract: Should perfectionist ideals of meaningful work play a signicant part in the design of economic systems? In an inuential article (Meaningful Work and Market Socialism), Richard Arneson rejected this traditional socialist view. Instead, he maintained, it should be left to the market, as a system that is consistent with the principle of neutrality, to determine the extent to which such work is available, and socialists should restrict their normative concerns primarily to issues of distributive justice. Against this it is argued here that market economies appear to be neutral only if understood in neo-classical, rather than institutionalist terms. From the latter perspective, market economies can be shown to take a number of institutionally distinct forms, which dier signicantly in how far they favour the satisfaction of preferences for meaningful work. Collective choices between these alternative systems should take account of these dierences, and the adoption of market economies does not avoid the need for perfectionist judgments in politics.
should not try to judge between them on the basis of some`objective', perfectionist theory of the good, and then design economic institutions which would realise what is`best'. Instead, they should concentrate on distributing justly the resources that enable people to satisfy their preferences, whatever they are, including the preference for meaningful work. And once a just distribution has been achievedwhich in Arneson's view will be a broadly egalitarian onethe market can be relied upon to respond to these preferences`fairly', in the sense of not privileging some over others. Socialists should therefore reject the idea of`a right to meaningful work'; nor should they regard its provision as an over-riding policy goal. Instead they should accept that:
The central issue is fairness to people with disparate preferences.
The core socialist objection to a capitalist market is that people with fewer resources than others through no fault of their own do not have a fair chance to satisfy their preferences. The solution to this problem is not to privilege anyone's preferences but to tinker with the distribution of resources that individuals bring to market transactions. (Arneson 1987, 537) This`tinkering' with the distribution of resources is a good deal more radical than the term might lead one to expect. It involves the creation of: These labour-managed rms are democratically controlled; capital is either owned by each rm, or rented at competitive rates, and the members of each rm have a collective right to decide how to employ its capital and how to dispose of its prot stream (534). However, Arneson emphasises that the purpose of these market socialist institutions is to remove some of the major sources of (unjust) inequality in capitalist market economies, especially its distribution of property, and not to realise a`right to meaningful work'.
(socialist) advocates of meaningful work have regarded as central to this: work that is interesting, that calls for intelligence and initiative, and that is attached to a job that gives the worker considerable freedom to decide how the work is to be done [...] .`Interesting' work is itself understood as requiring the development or exercise of the individual's intellectual or craft talents, and it must present a moderate challenge to these talents and skills (i.e. be neither too dicult nor too easy).
3 I shall largely follow Arneson in this characterisation of meaningful work, though I shall often call it good work instead. 4
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section I set out the key elements in Arneson's overall argument, giving particular attention to his use of neo-classical economic concepts. In section 2, I consider a number of possible objections to the incorporation of`good-work' preferences into the neo-classical framework he adopts, and argue that none of these are persuasive. In section 3 I introduce a dierent approach to understanding the possibilities for good work in market economies, based on an`institutionalist' alternative to neo-classical economics. I then argue that the adoption of this institutionalist approach points to serious problems for Arneson's endorsement of (socialist) market economies and the principle of fairness. In the nal section I discuss the implications of this alternative for the respective merits of perfectionism and welfarism. 5
Arneson's Argument
Arneson declares himself to be a welfarist: he believes that a person's good consists exclusively in the satisfaction of their preferences, whatever these may be.
An important implication of welfarism, as he notes, is that the only legitimate rating or ranking of someone's preferencesthe only kind of acceptable`discrimination' between themis that made by the person whose preferences they are. So, for example, if good work matters less to someone than high income, then`their good' likewise consists more in high income than in good work.
3 Arneson initially introduces the concept of meaningful work via the famous`hunting and shing' passage in The German Ideology, in which communism is presented as overcoming what would now be termed the`social' division of labour. But in the`summary denition' of good work, it seems clear that Arneson has a less radical (and more plausible) ideal in mind roughly, of overcoming the`detail(ed) division of labour'. Later in the article he sometimes reverts to the more radical version, to indicate how very`costly' good work might be, but I will ignore this and stick with his working denition.
When it comes to issues of public policyand hence the use of state powers the welfarist insists there should be no discrimination between dierent people's various preferences, that none should be privileged over others.
6 The state should be neutral between these: it should respect all preferences equally, and in doing so it will be respecting all people equally. The concept (and term) that Arneson mainly uses to express such ideas is fairness. But what does this mean in practice? Clearly, it implies the state should not use its coercive powers to prohibit or require the satisfaction of some preferences, while permitting that of others.
But there is a further requirement of fairness to which Arneson gives particular attention, related to the fact that the satisfaction of at least many kinds of preferences is a costly business.
The satisfaction of a preference is costly when it makes use of resources that could have been used to satisfy other preferences, and (kinds of ) preferences dier in how costly or expensive they are. What fairness requires is that these dierential costs be taken fully into account in decisions about which preferences are to be satised, and to what extent: it should not, as it were, be just as easy to satisfy a more expensive preference as it is a cheaper one. Thus subsidising certain kinds of preferencesor imposing additional costs on others, eg through taxationis ruled out by the principle of fairness to which welfarists are committed.
7
Arneson emphasises that this welfarist principle of fairnessand its specic application to preferences for good workis only a viable basis for public policy if there is some appropriate institutional means through which it can eectively be applied.
8 This requirement, he says, can in fact be met, namely by the market.
Thus:
If state enforcement of meaningful work and state subsidy promoting it are unfair policies because they discriminate in favor of people who happen to have a taste for this particular good, what does constitute a fair state policy in this regard? My answer to this question is the conventional one that under familiar idealised assumptions a suitably regulated market economy respects everyone's various preferences and satises the liberal ideal of state neutrality. The proper goal of state policy is to help people get what they want. Insofar as distributive justice requires the state to redistribute entitlements in 6 In fact, Arneson suggests that welfarism is itself best understood as a view about how people's good should be dened for the purposes of public policy (see footnote 18, 527). Thus it would be possible, in eect, to be a non-welfarist (i.e. perfectionist) about the good, but a welfarist about public policy. 7 This account of Arneson's reasoning involves some degree of reconstruction, for which I have drawn on Dworkin's seminal discussion of neutrality and markets (Dworkin 1978) ; see also the discussion of expensive and inexpensive tastes in Miller 1990, ch. 3. Arneson's welfarist opposition to subsidising good-work preferences can be seen as analogous to neutralist liberals' opposition to arts subsidies.
8 I have urged that from a welfarist standpoint there is no reason for the state to favour some preferences, such as those for meaningful work, over any others. This claim defeats the right to meaningful work only on the assumption that without it, institutions can function to give all individuals a fair chance of satisfying whatever preferences they happen to have, including their meaningful work preferences. (529) order to promote equality, the goal of such redistribution is to help the worse o get more of whatever they want. The market, or rather an idealised model of the market, is recommended by its eciency;
it is unfair to deny a person a good if the good can be provided to him costlessly, without loss to anyone else. (533) Arneson's appeal here to the concept of (allocative) eciency, with its standard neo-classical denition as Pareto-optimality, is crucial to his argument.
His view that market economies enable the welfarist principle of fairness to be realised depends both on the neo-classical claim that, subject to certain qualications, they meet the requirements of eciency, and on the concept of fairness having been specied in a way that ties it so closely to that of eciency.
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I will consider these qualications to the market's eciency later. In practice, then, the (reasonable) perfectionist will have to treat the dierent good lives that individuals wish to pursue, including the priority they give to dierent goods, in the same way that the welfarist treats people's preferences.
Furtherand here we return to the issue of`costliness' note earlierthis is not just a matter of`respecting them equally' but also of`taking costs into account'. This is argued by Arneson in his response to a possible objection to this`practical assimilation'. The objection could be put in the following terms:
Why regard a right to meaningful work as necessarily assuming that this is the only or dominant good? Why shouldn't one institute a right to meaningful work, and also rights to the various other goods that people (quite reasonably) value? If the sources of human well-being are indeed plural, let us ensure they are all available as options for people to pursue'. 12
But the problem with this, Arneson thinks, is that`making goods available' is a costly business. A society's resources are always limited, so that increasing the availability of one good is typically to reduce the availability of others. we know that individuals dier in how they themselves rank these goods for their own purposes, so it would be necessary to take account of these rankings in making such decisions.
So now we are back to`the market solution'. Putting the argument in Hayekian terms (though Arneson himself does not do so): there is no way in which these kinds of decisions can be made collectively, at a societal level. Instead, they should be`devolved' to individuals, acting within the framework of a market economy in which the price mechanism does all the necessary workand in which, one might add, individuals are therefore required to`bear the costs' of their decisions about which preferences to satisfy (or which conceptions of the good to pursue).
However, as Arneson emphasises, the market will not always achieve ecient, and hence fair, outcomes; as neo-classical economists recognise, it will do so on- of the distinction between`strong' and`weak' versions of meaningful work as a right, the latter being the right to its availability as an option, and his claim that the arguments against (even) a weak right to meaningful work apply also to adopting the availability of this option as aǹ over-riding' policy goal. See also the`manna from heaven' point in footnote 38, 544.
considering the possible implications for meaningful work of the two standard kinds of departure from these ideal conditions, namely market imperfections and market failures. In the case of imperfections, he suggests that both deciencies in people's cognitive powers (imperfect information/processing), and labour market rigidities, may be expected to have some signicant (though by no means overwhelming) impact. I shall put the former aside, and comment briey on the latter.
Arneson argues that labour market rigidities may be signicant because they would prevent individuals being able to negotiate deals with employers in which lower wages were accepted so that work could be more meaningful, given that the preferred form of work would be less protable than its usual form at the normal wage. However, as he recognises in his later discussion of market failures, this picture of individuals negotiating for special adjustments to an existing organisation of production is somewhat unrealistic, since the features of good work that individuals wish to enjoy may often have the character of public goods, at the level of rms and their potential employees: that is, they can only be available for particular individuals if they are also available for everyone else.
An obvious example is the speed of an assembly line.
However, Arneson argues that this public goods problem can reasonably be expected not to be a major one. This is because it will be in the interests of competing rms in a market (socialist) economy to organise themselves in a variety of dierent ways, each of which caters for a specic set of work-related preferences, including income, leisure, and good work: there would be incentives for these rms to develop what he calls dierent`packages' of these goods.
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Having completed my account of Arneson's argument, I turn now to its critical assessment. In the following section, I shall consider some objections to the possibility of incorporating preferences for good workhenceforth, GWPs within a neo-classical understanding of market economies. I will suggest that these objections are not conclusive, though they certainly raise some dicult issues.
2.`Neo-classical Markets' and Good-Work Preferences I will focus here on possible criticisms of Arneson's claim that a market economy can meet the requirements of welfarism (and hence also of defensible perfectionism) in its treatment of`preferences for good work' (GWPs). In doing so I
shall put aside problems of market imperfection and failure of the kind Arneson himself recognises, since my concern is with whether there are diculties of a more radical nature for his position.
14 I will consider in turn three objections, encapsulated in the following claims: (i) that there is no such thing as`a market for good work'; (ii) that good work is a non-commodity-based (conception of the) good; (iii) that there is nothing inherently`costly' about good work.
(i) There is no market for good work. This objection goes as follows. The way in which Arneson talks about people's varying GWPs being (potentially) met by competing rms makes it sound as if there is`a market for good work', in the same sense as there are markets for various kinds of consumer goods. But surely there is no such thing as a`market for good work' ? There is, of course, a market for labour, in which workers oer their labour for sale, and employers oer wages to purchase this (and at least in a`perfect' market, supply and demand determine its price). But in labour markets,`good work' is not being bought and sold; if it were, one would presumably expect workers to be paying rms for providing this. And if there is no market for good work, how can it be claimed that market economies will treat its provision`fairly' ?
However, Arneson's discussion of the dierent`packages' that can be oered by rms to potential workers provides a possible answer to this objection. In the simplest case, each package will contain a particular combination of good work, income and leisure (i.e. hours not to be worked). These, he says, can be seen as analogous to the various`qualities' that are typically combined in consumer products, and which are, in eect, what the consumer is`buying', rather than`the product as such'. So someone`buying a car' will be interested, say, in the combination of aesthetic style, economy of operation, and speed, and individual consumers can be expected to rank these qualities dierently. There is no`market for automobile stylishness', only for cars, but a market economy will cater eciently for these various preferences for specic qualities. Likewise, then, although there is no`market for good work', but only for labour, a market economy can provide eciently (and hence fairly) for the various qualities of workits goodness, its wages, its amount etc.
(ii) Good work is not a commodity based preference (conception of the good).
This objection draws on an argument presented by David Miller in his discussion of`market neutrality' (Miller 1990, ch. 3 Although Miller does not himself apply this argument to GWPs, it seems natural' to do so, since they would presumably qualify as non-commodity based CoGs. But would such an argument then be persuasive? The most obvious diculty is that some criterion is required by reference to which the proportionality or disproportionality of`sacrices' can be determined. Arneson could surely argue that if people are not prepared to give up the amount of income that would be necessary to satisfy their GWPs, this just shows that they do not value these suciently strongly to outweigh the sacrices that are perfectly fair, given the costs of satisfying these:`too great a sacrice' can only mean a sacrice they are unwilling to make. And if it were objected that this argument illicitly assimilates non-commodity based CoGs to commodity based ones, by implicitly`putting a price' on the former, it might be replied that no such`pricing' is implied: all that is being claimed is that people are able to make intelligible decisions about the priorities they will give to the achievement of dierent kinds of goods.
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(iii) There is nothing inherently costly about good work. Whenever Arneson talks about the satisfaction of GWPs, he draws attention to their costliness, and insists that the extent to which they are satised must reect these costs; the market is endorsed because this is what it ensures. For example, in the kind of negotiation between an employer and employee which, as noted in the previous section, he thinks is prevented by labour market rigidities, he seems to have the following kind of dialogue in mind:`I'd much prefer it if this job could be made a better oneless supervision, more use of initiative etc', to which the employer replies,`Fine, but your wages will have to be lower, because if you work that way the rm's output would fall, or the quality of its products would be reduced, and competition would reduce our prots if we kept our prices at their current level'.
And when Arneson describes the dierent`packages' oered by rms, catering for workers' dierently-ordered preferences, his assumption is that a package with`better work' will have`lower income' (just as one with`more leisure', i.e.
fewer hours, will).
But why should this be so? Why should good work necessarily be`costly', and hence have to be traded o against income? That there is something wrong with this assumption is at least suggested by the fact that (roughly speaking) in actual market economies there is typically a positive correlation between good work and high incomes, and between low incomes and`bad work'. Shouldn't one expect the reverse to be the case, if people are having to`sacrice income for good work', or vice versa?
Admittedly, the relevance of this`fact' is problematic, since it refers to what happens in actual, capitalist market economies, and might not hold true in Arneson's projected egalitarian market socialist economy, in which the former's members of the former requires them to make undue nancial sacrices in competing with the latter, and hence that the state should provide special support for these cooperatives. How this relates to Arneson's view of market socialism is too complicated to discuss here. Miller's other example is of workers who wish to work part-time, because of the value they place on caring for children or the elderly.
inequalities of income and wealth are greatly reduced. However, this is not the only reason for questioning the inherent costliness of good work. Consider, for example,`the absence of close supervision', a standard feature of such work.
Robert Lane has argued that not only is this a signicant source of intrinsic work-satisfaction, but that jobs dier in the extent to which their eective performance is enhanced or reduced by close supervision; likewise, systems of`payment by results' are widely disliked by workers (who interpret them as forms of control rather than reward), but for some kinds of work they are quite eective in terms of output, whereas for others they are counter-productive (Lane 1991 (Lane , ch. 1819 . So in some cases,`making work better' will be`better for the rm', and in other cases it will not; only in the latter case is good work`costly', and might thus lead to workers facing a choice between better work and higher income.
However, even if all this is true, it is unclear whether it provides a persuasive objection to Arneson. For although he repeatedly draws attention to the costliness of GWPs, he is arguably not committed to the claim that good work (the satisfaction of such preferences) is necessarily (or even usually) costly. Rather, he might only be claiming that if and when it is, this must (for the sake of fairness) be taken into account when determining the extent to which such preferences should be satised. (So the reason why he never mentions their possible non-costliness is that such cases are unproblematic with respect to issues of fairness.)
To conclude this section: although each of these objections raises some important issues and possible diculties for Arneson's argument, none of them appear to present insuperable problems for his attempt to incorporate GWPs into a neo-classical framework. In the following section I shall introduce a quite dierent approach to understanding the nature of market economies, and the possibilities for the satisfaction of GWPs that they provide. I shall do so by looking at how comparative political economists, working within a theoretical framework of institutional, rather than neo-classical, economics, have identied and analysed the dierences between certain`varieties of capitalism'. to switch funds in response to relatively short-term changes in company prots.
In Germany, by contrast, the major shareholders are other companies and banks, whose holdings in one company form a large proportion of their total holdings, and whose concerns are often strategic as well as nancial. UK companies are also more vulnerable to takeovers than their German counterparts, due partly to regulatory dierences. Finally, Hall and Soskice argue that these complementarities give rise to a number of overall dierences between the organisation and behaviour of rms in LMEs and CMEs. For example, LME rms typically engage in price-based competition, by contrast with the quality-based competition characteristic of CMEs; closely related to this, CME rms make extensive use of highly skilled workers, whereas production in LMEs is more dependent on unskilled labour.
They give particular attention to a distinction between two kinds of innovation, radical' and`incremental'. The former involves the introduction of radically new products and ways of organising production; the latter involves gradual improvement of established products and ways of producing them, with a strong focus on quality-control and enhancement. Firms in LMEs, they argue, are especiallỳ well equipped' for the former, and rms in CMEs for the latter, for reasons they set out as follows:
It will be easier to secure incremental innovation where the workforce (extending all the way down to the shop oor) is skilled enough to come up with such innovations, secure enough to risk suggesting changes to products or process that might alter their job situation, and endowed with enough work autonomy to see these kinds of improvements as a dimension of their job. Thus, incremental innovation should be most feasible where corporate organization provides workers with secure employment, autonomy from close monitoring, and opportunities to inuence the decisions of the rm, where the skill system provides workers with more than task-specic skills and, ideally, high levels of industry-specic technical skills [...] . ( 21 Hence the prospects for individuals with GWPs being able to satisfy these preferences will likewise be better in CMEs than in LMEs.
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So it seems that these two kinds of (capitalist) market economy dier signicantly in the extent to which they favour the satisfaction of GWPs.
23 One might put this by saying that neither of them is`neutral', in this respect, but that they dier in the direction of their respective`biases'.
24 But these biases do not result from the kinds of interference in the market to which Arneson is opposed. There is no subsidy for GWPs in CMEs, nor does the state impose on rms a duty to cater for these preferences. Nor, conversely, does the state in LMEs tax or penalise GWPs, let alone prohibit rms from satisfying them. Rather, in both cases the preference-satisfaction biases are systemic, and are due to the specic institutional character of each kind of market economy.
These points can be connected to the issues about the`costliness' of good work discussed in the previous section. LMEs and CMEs, I suggest, can be seen as diering in how costly they make the satisfaction of GWPs. That is, the dierent ways in which production is typically organised and conducted by rms in these two kinds of market economy, which result from broader institutional dierences between them, are such that it is less costly to satisfy GWPs in CMEs than in LMEs. There is, as it were, no need to provide subsidies for jobs involving high levels of skill and work-process autonomy in CMEs, because it is precisely by providing jobs of this kind that rms are best able to operate protably, given the institutional framework within which they operate. By contrast, for rms in LMEs to satisfy the same GWPs that their CME counterparts are happy to satisfy (and for the same wages) would often be less advantageous.
But if the costliness of satisfying GWPs is at least partly a function of (diering) forms of (institutionally shaped) business organisation, one cannot appeal 20 The claim that varieties of capitalism dier in this respect is not peculiar to Hall and of LME cost-structures, GWPs are being unfairly subsidised in CMEs; judged in terms of CME cost-structures, GWPs are being unfairly penalised in LMEs.
But neither judgment should be made, since this would ignore the institutional dependence of costs and relativity of fairness.
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A further implication of this argument is that one cannot rest one's hopes oǹ the market', or`a market economy', as the institutional means through which the principle of fairnessand with it, the commitment to welfarismcan be realised in practice. Or at least, one cannot do so if it is true, as I have implicitly assumed, that any actual market economy will necessarily have some specic institutional form, and that these forms can dier in the kinds of ways exemplied by LMEs and CMEs.
26 For then a political choice has to be made between these dierent institutional forms, and instead of being able to`leave it to the market' to determine the extent to which GWPs are satised, collective decisions must be taken about which kinds of preferences are to be (systemically) favoured.
Institutional Economics and Perfectionist Politics
In the preceding section I have argued that if Hall and Soskice are right, and the inferences I have drawn are justied, then institutionally dened varieties of capitalist market economy dier signicantly in the extent to which they favour the satisfaction of preferences for good work, and that this presents a serious challenge to Arneson's endorsement of market economies and the principle of fairness. By contrast, I argued in section 2 that there were no insuperable problems in incorporating GWPs into a neo-classical analysis of market economies, and in showing that they would thus be treated fairly if it were`left to the market' to determine the extent of their satisfaction.
What this contrast suggeststo put it somewhat dramaticallyis that Arneson's position stands or falls with the theoretical adequacy of neo-classical economics; a little less dramatically, that its plausibility would be seriously undermined if market economies were better understood, as I believe they are, in institutional, rather than neo-classical terms. This is not the place to attempt a defence of that belief, which would anyway have to begin with a lengthy discussion of dierent forms of institutionalism (of which there are as many varieties as there are of capitalism).
27 But there is one point of clarication about the nature of institutional economics that should be made here.
A standard contrast between neo-classical and institutional economics is that whereas the former`takes preferences as given', and then explains how economic agents (including rms) act upon and respond to these, the latter takes it as one of its central tasks to show how preferences are themselves`shaped' by institutions. So even if it is true that political choices between dierent economic institutions require collective decisions about the signicance to be accorded to GWPs, it does not follow that these must be made on perfectionist grounds; some additional, independent argument would be needed to support this further claim, and I shall not try to provide one here. But what I have argued does, I suggest, weaken the case for welfarism and against perfectionism. This is for two reasons.
First, as noted in section 1 above, Arneson emphasises that the attractiveness of welfarism is dependent on there being viable institutions that enable its aims to be realised (Arneson 1987, 529) . He argues that markets do just this; but if this is only so on a neo-classical understanding of markets, and if the kind of institutional analysis of markets I have presented is theoretically preferable to this, then welfarism becomes a good deal less attractive. Second, the kinds of political decisions about economic institutions that I have argued need to be made are not ones that, were they to be made on a perfectionist rather than welfarist basis, would necessarily pose a serious threat to liberal principles or values.
32
31 Admittedly, those in the minority may`suer', but if economic institutions dier systemically in the ways I have argued, that must always be a possibility. In practice, though, given that the dierences between CMEs and LMEs are in many respects`dierences of degree', it is unlikely that this minority will nd reasonably attractive options entirely unavailable.
32 Admittedly, Arneson does not himself appeal explicitly to these kinds of reasons for endorsing welfarism. But as the nal paragraph below indicates, I have in mind a more general What I have in mind here is this. The principle of (state) neutrality, which has much in common with Arneson's welfarism, is often justied on the grounds that any departures from it would be inimical to individual autonomy, or at odds with basic civil rights, or would legitimise paternalistic legislation, and so on. But suppose that a political decision were made to`institute' an economy in the form of a CME rather than an LME, at least partly on the perfectionist grounds that good work was a suciently valuable source of human ourishing to make the former preferable to the latter.
33`A ll that is being chosen' here are institutions that, as it were, shift the set of possible individual choices in one direction rather than another. The state is no`stronger' or`more invasive' in CMEs than in LMEs;
34 the civil rights record of`actual CMEs' such as Germany is not obviously inferior to that of LMEs, such as the UK or USA; individuals in CMEs are not legally required to engage in meaningful work,`for their own good', and so on. Further, to the extent that individual choices are constrained by institutional arrangements, this is no more so in CMEs than in LMEs, and such constraints will obtain whether the institutions concerned are politically justied in welfarist or perfectionist terms.
To conclude, I shall point briey to a broader framework within which the arguments I have presented in this paper can be located. There is an intellectually powerful and morally attractive form of liberal political theory which combines commitment to state neutrality with the endorsement (subject to requirements of distributive justice) of market economies, understood in neo-classical terms. 35 A position that I have elsewhere (Keat 2008b) termed`liberal(ly constrained) perfectionism'.
